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Abstract
In 2004, Ernie Fletcher, governor of Kentucky and licensed physician, brought on an ethical
controversy of first impression by signing a death warrant for Thomas Clyde Bowling. A
coalition of doctors, death penalty opponents, and medical students waged a very public
campaign criticizing Fletcher for violating the Hippocratic Oath, and submitted a formal
complaint to the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure demanding that he lose his license to
practice medicine. The study examines this controversy for insights into the ways argument
creates, challenges and manages identity, particularly under conditions of extreme role stress.
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On November 8, 2004, much as on any other day, Ernie Fletcher took care of the
paperwork that went with the job. It seems unlikely that he knew, as he worked, that he had just
given the first push to an ethical snowball. Handling the paperwork itself was a somber occasion,
but a reasonably good career move; one year, to the week, after Fletcher had been elected
governor of Kentucky, he signed his first death warrant for a condemned prisoner, Thomas Clyde
Bowling (Yetter, 2004a). The previous governor, Paul Patton, had ordered the first two
executions since the Supreme Court’s reinstatement of capital punishment, and had turned back a
bill to abolish it in Kentucky (Chellgren, 2000) with little public reaction, so Fletcher likely was
unprepared for the argument set in motion by this exercise of his authority. However, there was
one important difference between himself and Patton, and that difference would entangle
Fletcher in a crisis of role stress.
In argument, the element of arguers’ identity has drawn spotty attention. From Ehninger’s
(1970) observation that people who join in argument put their identities at mutual risk, to a more
extended discussion of the factor inspired by Hazen & Williams (1997), many scholars have
attended to it in prefatory comments and asides, and a few have addressed it as the core of a
sustained work. Antczak (1990) explains that the choices made by arguers lock them into a
persona, reasoning from a pattern of claims William Seward developed in response to the pre-
Civil War slavery crisis to the conclusion that “public figures constitute their characters in
argument; they talk themselves into being, into a practical public identity – into some of the
specific possibilities and limitations for word and action with which they must subsequently
contend” (p. 1108). While argument scholarship conventionally analyzes the rational merit of
arguments and argument practices, this argument-borne identity draws from the relational
content of the messages; the more compelling identity arguments are “those which stimulate the
individual’s (or collective’s) desire and willingness to associate” (Hazen & Williams, 1997, p. v).
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This practical public identity is at constant risk of being overcoded, as through the ongoing
struggle of a controversy “arguments define identities that may not be consistent with each
arguer’s self-image” (Kline, 1986, p. 243). The choice of argument projects an identity to other
participants, but their replies also shape the image.
While for very prominent and visible figures, this may primarily or entirely involve their
unique individual identity, far more often argument shapes collective identities, tweaking the
norms attached to public roles (Hazen & Williams, 1997; McKerrow & Bruner, 1997). Ernie
Fletcher’s critical difference from Paul Patton was not his biography, his image, or his personal
skill set; it was a formalized, discursively constituted role that abides near the top of the
hierarchy of social roles in most cultures. Ernie Fletcher was only the fourth U.S. governor ever
to hold an M.D. And on November 8, 2004, he became the first licensed physician since the
adoption of the AMA’s binding code of ethics to order a man put to death as punishment for a
crime.1 Thomas Clyde Bowling had been convicted of killing a young husband and wife one
morning as they arrived to open their business. As he sat on death row, his attorneys deployed a
creative array of appeals: Bowling was mentally retarded, there was no formal protocol for lethal
injection in Kentucky’s laws, new evidence suggested another person may have been involved in
the killing. And Ernie Fletcher was a licensed physician, so his decision to sign the death warrant
arguably violated both the Hippocratic Oath, and the laws of Kentucky which criminalized
breaches of the AMA’s code of medical ethics (Yetter, 2004c). 
This was hardly the first time someone had questioned the ethics of a physician taking
part in an execution. Medicine and the death penalty have a venerable association, from Dr.
1 “According to the National Governors Association, there have been three other doctors who have been U.S.
governors since the AMA guidelines took effect in 1980. But none was in the position of having to decide whether to
sign a death warrant. Dr. Otis Ray Bowen of Indiana left office in 1981 without signing a death warrant. Vermont,
where Dr. Howard Dean spent 12 years as governor, has no death penalty. Dr. John Kitzhaber was governor during
two executions in Oregon before leaving office in 2003. But the Oregon governor does not sign an execution warrant
- a judge does. Kitzhaber could have granted clemency to the condemned but chose not to” (Barrouquere, 2004, ¶
13-14).
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Joseph Guillotin’s 18th century campaign to win acceptance of the machine later named for him
(Baum, 2002), to Drs. Carlos MacDonald and E.C. Spitzka’s 19th century pursuit of the same
objective, thankfully without gaining a macabre namesake, for the electric chair (Ragon, 1995),
to Dr. Stanley Deutsch, whose detailed recipe for a lethal injection allowed Oklahoma to codify
the method in law in 1977, and Texas to carry out the first such execution in 1982 (Tuohy, 2005).
Nevertheless, many physicians resist any involvement with an execution because, they say, it
turns the healing art on its head: doctors’ most bitter enemy is death, doctors’ ultimate failure is
death, and so doctors who deliberately causes death commit treason against their role no less
stark than judges who accept bribes, or parents who choose to harm their children. The American
Medical Association splits the finest of hairs in forbidding, in its model ethical code, all but the
most passive medical contact with any execution: doctors may not pronounce the condemned
person dead, but after someone else has done so, they may certify the death, acting only to
confirm the performative conclusion of the penalty (American Medical Association [AMA],
2005). At the same time, many states require the presence of a doctor at executions, and some
states’ protocols call for the doctor to taken an active part, creating a double-bind in which “The
physician cannot make an ethical choice” (Salguero, 1986, p. 168). Baum (2002) warns that as
questions about the fairness of capital punishment grow in urgency, “central to that evaluation is
the appropriate role for the scientific community, and particularly the medical profession, in the
accurate and ethical implementation of that punishment” (p. 50). 
And yet, all Ernie Fletcher did was take pen in hand and sign his name to a piece of
paper. No class in medical school, no experience during his residency, equipped him with skills
that would be needed to order the execution carried out. Thus, the complaint, joined by medical
students and anti-capital punishment activists, raised a case of first impression to be debated by
the public, by professionals, and by formal governing bodies: did Ernie Fletcher’s involvement in
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Bowling’s punishment violate medical ethics, even though Fletcher used absolutely no medical
knowledge or technique in carrying out his part? 
With a physician serving as Senate majority leader, six physicians in the House
(Lawrence, 2004), and another physician having moved from front-runner for the Democratic
presidential nomination to chair of the Democratic National Committee (Kornblut, 2005), it
seems as though Governor Fletcher’s death warrant might not be the last instance of a doctor
ordering, under her or his own authority, that a person be put to death as punishment for a crime.
Senator Frist, when he speaks to audiences of doctors, urges them to enter politics (Vandewater,
2003). The role stress that arises when a licensed doctor is called upon to serve as decisionmaker
in a capital case demands resolution, and the arguments generated as the medical community
attacks the issue should generate a bountiful harvest of clues to the contours of the collective
identity of doctors.
In the sections that follow, I will analyze the controversy surrounding Fletcher’s death
warrant for characteristics of identity creation, challenge and management through argument. 
I will begin by examining the ways doctors’ roles are constituted and their norms generated and
maintained, then survey the controversy over doctors’ participation in carrying out capital
sentences. Then I will examine the arguments presented by Fletcher’s critics and defenders,
including Fletcher’s own words. Finally, I will summarize my findings.
Review of literature
Three scholars have contributed useful pieces to this puzzle about the professional
identity of doctors: Ken Gatter, Arthur Applbaum, and Donald Judges. Gatter (1999) charts the
relationships between medical authority and legal authority, identifying the elements that encyst
deliberation on medical controversies within the community. He catalogs exhaustively the
techniques that medical school professors use to socialize medical students into novice initiates
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into the medical guild: intensive coursework and testing, isolation from outsiders, disciplinary
moves during oral exams and rounds, and maintenance through board exams and specialization.
Once the newcomers are cemented into their web of relationships with other medical
professionals, no outside influence can budge their decisions: judges, legislators, all rely on the
word of trained medical professionals to explain disease, medical practice, proper behavior of
doctors, and virtually all other matters that are open to question. Gatter further pinpoints the gap
between science, which, to outside observers, appears to be the foundation of medical
knowledge, and appropriateness, a concept employed by doctors to explain the variation in
practice from one office to another. Because each illness is unique, each injury unique, each
patient unique, and each doctor’s judgment unique, the combination cannot be observed, tested,
and the results replicated in a scientifically satisfying fashion; instead, doctors judge other
doctors only on the appropriateness of the practice, or its location within the acceptable range of
choices a well-trained doctor can make. Thus, doctors are dependent on a consensus formed
within their community to maintain their authority and autonomy against such interference from
the outside world as malpractice charges. 
Applbaum (1999) builds upon Gatter’s model, explaining that there is only limited
potential for outside criticism of medical practice. He argues for role positivism, or an
understanding of role as being little more than what its practitioners are doing at any moment.
Speaking in particular of the medical profession, Applbaum warns that if too many restrictions
are placed upon doctors, they’ll simply announce that they have adopted a different identity –
Applbaum whimsically names them “schmoctors” – and continue practicing according to their
own lights. Despite this fortification against outside challenges, Applbaum offers hope that
medical practice can be held to a high standard of propriety, not through regulation and
punishment, but through argument: 
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The profession of doctoring must therefore understand itself as a calling that could have
been otherwise, but argue why it still is a calling worthy of being answered by a reflective
practitioner. Insofar as doctors continue to identify with their profession, and look to their
colleagues for guidance and support on what counts as good professional practice – that
is, insofar as those with medical training wish to subject themselves to the judgment and
approval of their peers – they will reject the label of schmoctor. The challenge, of course,
is to continue to articulate in a clear and reasoned voice to both doctors and patients what
would be lost if the practice of doctoring gave way, in substantial measure, to the various
forms of schmoctoring that I have described (p. 60).
Applbaum warns that efforts to blunt or thwart medical autonomy are futile, and even
undesirable if they were possible, but harnessing the pride and stubbornness that accompany such
authority is a more effective and desirable approach to steering medical practice toward the ideal.
Of the three, only Judges (2004) directly addresses doctors’ entanglement with
executions. He develops two ideas which shed light on this controversy. First, Judges warns that
even if wardens and judges join with bioethicists to win the argument over the ethical
permissibility of doctors’ involvement, the “considerable psychological cost” to the doctors (p.
518, emphasis mine) is an undiscussed factor. He examines arguments in the lethal injection
controversy and discovers moral disengagement, borrowing the framework from Bandura et al.
(1996), in arguments that diffuse responsibility among multiple decisionmakers, downplay
proximity of preparatory acts to the lethal act, and otherwise rationalize participation through
convoluted reasoning. Judges also contrasts thin medical ethics, or ethics that answer the
question “Have I behaved unethically,” from thick medical ethics, or ethics that answer the
question “What identity have I created for myself?” He urges doctors to treat their ethics as thick
in departures as egregious as participation in an execution.
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The argument
The complaint filed against Fletcher was neither accidental nor a spur of the moment
decision; rather, it was a single high profile move in the broader strategy of a handful of anti-
death penalty activists. Arthur Zitrin, like Ernie Fletcher, is a physician, but Zitrin is also a
member of the American Bar Association’s Committee on Capital Punishment (Richardson,
2004). He admits that his efforts to end doctors’ participation in executions has “been a quixotic
effort in some respects” (Robeznieks, 2004, ¶ 7), but one to which he has devoted ample time
and energy policing threats to the collective identity: “I think it’s a totally improper role for a
physician to be complicit with the state in killing people, because it’s not the role of a doctor to
do that. The role of a doctor is to heal and to preserve life whenever there is a possibility of doing
so” (Campos, 2005, p. 1A). Jonathan I. Groner, who directs the trauma unit of Columbus
Children’s Hospital in Ohio (Crane, 2004), worked to organize the complaints against Fletcher
on medical ethics grounds, calling his alliance “rag-tag,” but enough to make doctors
“uncomfortable” by drawing attention to their role transgression. Other participants in the
argument include the Kentucky Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (KCADP), headed by the
Reverend Patrick Delahanty, (Biesk, 2004), and a group of thirty medical students at the
University of Kentucky medical school, Fletcher’s alma mater (Musgrave, 2004). 
The complaint came in two  parts: first, Fletcher was violating his Hippocratic Oath by
signing the warrant; second, Fletcher was violating the law, which incorporated the AMA’s code
of professional ethics into Kentucky state law. The medical students began their letter, even
before mentioning the death warrant, asking Fletcher to “remember and respect the value
intrinsic to the health profession, that first and foremost we must not harm” (Text of, 2004, ¶ 1).
Dr. Stewart Urbach, one of the signers of KCADP’s letter, reasoned, “The basic Hippocratic
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Oath is 'do no harm,' and execution does irreparable harm” (Kentucky Governor’s, 2004, ¶ 5).
KCADP’s press release included an even more specific criticism: 
Dr. Ernie Fletcher, Governor of Kentucky, abandoned his professional oath when he
signed a death warrant ordering the killing of Thomas C. Bowling by the State of
Kentucky. An active physician and licensed by the state of Kentucky to practice
medicine, Dr. Fletcher is bound by the oath every doctor takes. In part, it states, “I will
give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked nor suggest any such counsel.” (Kentucky
Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, 2004, ¶¶ 2-3)
Finally, one of Fletcher’s political rivals, Democratic state representative Jim Wayne, perhaps
sensing a good sound bite, contrasted his loyalties: “It's curious he will keep his no-new-taxes
pledge but will violate his Hippocratic oath. I'm not sure how he sleeps at night with this kind of
decision” (Barrouquere, 2004, ¶ 16.) 
For some, the charge that Fletcher had violated the oath would ring hollow. Various
commentators have dismissed the Oath as obsolete (Baum, 2002; Davis, 1995), too doctor-
centered at the expense of patients’ autonomy (Hasday, 2002), and so full of anachronisms that
most medical schools edit it to the point of unrecognizability before administering it to their
students (Colburn, 1991). Others view the Oath in the same light as founding documents such as
the Magna Carta or the Declaration of Independence: while its precise phrasing may not serve to
capture the current state of medical ethics, it does provide the medical community with a
heritage, strengthening its cohesion and streamlining its norm-maintenance (Markel, 2004; Lucas
& Pross, 1995). Smith’s (1996) historic research documents a pattern of increased use of the
Hippocratic Oath as a graduation ceremony at times when the medical community is under siege
from outside criticism. And, in particular, the Oath does more than set apart a collection of
practices that must be performed carefully and deliberately; more than that, it establishes an
Fletcher model 11
identity for those who would claim authority to carry out those practices: “Its essential purpose
was to identify the Greek group of physicians as healers who would never kill or harm their
patients” (Curran & Casscells, 1980, p. 227).
Violating the Hippocratic oath might sully Fletcher’s reputation as a doctor, and might
put him squarely at odds with images of beneficence and healing, but would not function as on-
point criticism of his job governing the state, so the second element of the charge pointed out that
he was violating Kentucky’s laws. The medical students’ letter continued, “We also remind you
of Kentucky state law, which states ‘No physician shall be involved in the conduct of an
execution’” (Text of, 2004, ¶ 3). Of course, what was left open to question was whether signing a
death warrant, far removed in space and time from the execution chamber, constituted
“participation.”
The core of Fletcher’s defense was the claim that he operated in multiple roles, and that
those roles could be deactivated while he carried out actions antithetical to their demands. He
told Fox News, “There is a distinct difference between acting as a physician for a patient and
acting as a governor for the people of the commonwealth of Kentucky” (Kentucky Governor’s,
2004, ¶ 2). Hogan told reporters, “The governor signed the warrant while carrying out his
responsibilities as governor. In no way does this conflict with the ethics of the governor's private
profession” (Yetter, 2004, ¶ 12). 
The complainants had a good deal to say in response. In their letter to the Kentucky Board
of Medical Licensure, KCADP asked, 
The basic question is whether or not a physician who voluntarily takes on an additional
role in life, that of an elected Governor, is thereby shed of the responsibilities and ethical
duties he has assumed in his role as physician. Do medical ethics apply only to the
doctor-patient relationship? Can Dr. Fletcher while maintaining his medical license
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simply say, “Thomas Bowling is not my patient,” and ethically sign his death warrant?
(Costanzo et al., 2004, p. 3)
Groner answered the question, posing a vivid hypothetical:
Not only has Governor Fletcher never renounced this oath, but he also demonstrates his
status as an active physician by holding a current Kentucky medical license.  If Governor
Fletcher was at an official state function and a guest keeled over from a heart attack or a
‘cafe coronary,’ would he fail to render aid on the grounds that he is the governor and
therefore not required to act as a physician? Of course not. Why? Because the ethical
tradition of the medical profession - which demands that physicians be healers and not
killers - is over 2,400 years old. (Groner, 2004, ¶¶ 2-3)
Zitrin drew the issue back to its parameters: the question was not whether Fletcher was a bad
person in the abstract, but whether he could continue to be licensed as a physician, given such
conduct: “But I believe that a physician is not freed of his obligation to comply with his
profession's ethical mandates. If Fletcher wanted to forgo that obligation, he should have
surrendered his license when he was elected” (Zitrin, 2004, p. B11). Finally, the KCADP letter
called into question whether Fletcher’s prior behavior had kept his roles distinct: “The question
may be compounded by the fact that in his campaign for Governor and while serving as
Governor, Dr. Fletcher has naturally enough expressed pride in being a physician, and has on
occasions rendered medical treatment to those in need” (Costanzo et al., 2004, p. 3) 
In fact, Fletcher seems to call upon one role to bolster his efforts to perform the other
quite freely. Campaigning for Congress, Fletcher concluded his stump speech on medical
malpractice reform with the plea, “I am uniquely qualified. As a physician, I play a major role in
good, and affordable health care” (Bratcher, 2000, ¶ 18). On another occasion, he told an
audience, “As a family physician, health care is an issue I've spent my adult life addressing. I
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promise to stand by a patient's bill of rights” (Nelson, 2000, ¶ 9). Upon being elected governor of
Kentucky, he outlined a list of cost-containment proposals in his inaugural address, concluding,
“As a physician, I am especially dedicated to improvements in this area.” (Fletcher, 2003, ¶ 46)
And in his 2005 State of the Commonwealth address, Fletcher called “upon my fellow
physicians” (2005, ¶ 135) to address the problem of over-prescribing. At times his language was
even more vivid and concrete; addressing malpractice reform on the gubernatorial trail, Fletcher
warned, “For the sake of Kentucky's patients we must stop this hemorrhaging. My prescription
for the problem is to call for a constitutional amendment that will grant the governor and
legislature the authority to tackle the medical malpractice issue” (Biesk, 2003, ¶ 6). Even the
Hippocratic requirement of nonmaleficence which he later would be accused of violating was
called into play as a sound bite; while still in Congress he warned against radical moves in health
care reform: “The lesson I took out of that is like the Hippocratic Oath: First, do no harm. I
respect what the other doctors are trying to do. But I'm afraid their plans would just make things
worse.” Later, after coming under fire during a gubernatorial candidate debate for voting against
legalizing the importation of prescription drugs from Canada, Fletcher told an interviewer, “I
knew when I voted against it that it would be an attack issue. But as a physician, I took a
Hippocratic oath to do no harm, and some of these drugs are dangerous” (Harris, 2003, p. C2).
Was a physician’s identity continuous, or could s/he deactivate it under certain
circumstances to participate in actions that gravely transgressed the Hippocratic ethic? Previous
writings on the permissibility of physician participation in lethal injection had grappled with this
issue, but the results had been mixed. Many drew the line at application of medical knowledge or
technique: if a doctor used doctor skills to commit an anti-Hippocratic act, then that constituted
an ethical infraction (Dworkin, 2002). Others argued that the proper motive for anyone to enter
medical school was a commitment to the value of care, meaning that the taint of participating in
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an execution struck to the heart of a physician’s integrity (Michalos, 1986; Sikora & Fleischman,
1999).  A stinging review of physician participation, compiled by the American College of
Physicians, Human Rights Watch, the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, and
Physicians for Human Rights (1994), warned that entanglement with capital punishment gave the
impression that doctors as a whole approved of the death penalty, which damaged public trust in
their commitment to healing. Unfortunately, the deliberations had never reached a situation in
which the doctor did not apply medical skill or knowledge, but instead gave the command that
the execution was to be carried out without further delay. The measures of involvement for
Fletcher’s participation in Bowling’s death sentence stretched in opposite directions: it was more
distant than typical medical tasks, including examining the condemned and certifying death, but
at the same time it was far more necessary, because the sentence could not be carried out until the
governor ordered prison officials to proceed.
A corollary of Fletcher’s core defense, developed in occasional comments to the press,
was to spread responsibility for the execution to other parties, a move predicted by Judges as a
dissociation move designed to minimize the psychological impact of carrying out an execution.
To a Fox News reporter, Fletcher said “I felt the jurors made a sound decision, and I wanted to
recognize they made a  sound decision and acknowledge that by signing the death warrant”
(Kentucky governor’s, 2004, ¶ 7). This argument grew into a claim of obligation, a duty to carry
out the will of the citizens expressed in their verdict. In a statement released to reporters, Fletcher
employed the obligation argument to attempt to shut down further discussion: 
As Governor with responsibility vested in me by the people of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky and after thorough review of the case of Mr. Thomas Clyde Bowling, Jr. by me
and my general counsel, I have decided to honor the decision of the jurors and sign the
warrant ordering the warden of the Kentucky State Penitentiary to carry out the execution
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of Thomas Clyde Bowling, Jr., on November 30, 2004. Consistent with previous
practices and consistent with the advice of legal counsel, I hope the press will honor my
decision not to take any further questions regarding this decision. (Keller, 2004, ¶¶ 4-5).
The governor’s general counsel, John Roach, made the case in even stronger terms, suggesting
that Fletcher’s membership in the medical community should make no difference in his
decisionmaking if the conventional practice of the criminal justice system dictated otherwise:
By signing a death warrant, in no way is Governor Ernie Fletcher participating in the
conduct of an execution. Governor Fletcher's role under the law is consistent with the
roles of judges fulfilling their legal duty and jurors fulfilling their legal obligations
regardless of their professions. While the Governor respects the view of those who
oppose capital punishment, he must reject the absurdity of the position that, because the
people of Kentucky elected a physician to serve as their Governor, they have effectively
chosen to abolish the death penalty during his term of office. (Keller, 2004, ¶¶ 6-7).
KCADP took great exception to this constrained view of the governor’s authority in their
complaint to the medical licensure board:
The law gives the Governor/Doctor authority to sign the death warrant, but neither the
law nor the Governor’s oath of office require him to do so. He also has the authority not
to sign a death warrant. He has the authority to commute the death sentence to life
without possibility of parole, or to life without possibility of parole for a term of years.
The Constitution and the law recognize the Governor both as an official and as a human
being with moral judgment, and give him the flexibility and the right not to execute. In
this instance the human being is Dr. Ernie Fletcher. Is it a violation of medical ethics for
him to sign a death warrant for Thomas Bowling? (Costanzo et al., 2004, p. 4)
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And while the analogy is best used sparingly, and has suffered from grave abuse in the past
(Caplan, 1992), it is worthwhile to note that in a past founding, or re-founding, event in medical
ethics, a group of doctors attempted to defend themselves against charges of grave breaches of
medical ethics, in some cases putting concentration camp inmates to death under the pretext that
they were sentenced to die, by insisting that a legitimately elected government had commanded
them, and had codified the command into law, to participate in what would become archetypal
transgressions of medical ethics. The doctors argued that they were powerless to refuse because
the government’s command had put their lives in danger if they did not comply. The judges, the
Nuremberg tribunal, rejected this defense, insisted that they should have complied with the
ethical requirements of medicine, and declared them criminally culpable for the deaths. One of
the lead defendants was Karl Brandt, Hitler’s personal physician, who had no face-to-face contact
with the prisoners whose torture and death made up the charges; instead, he had sat in an office at
a far remove and simply ordered the experiments carried out (Nuernberg Military Tribunals,
1949).
Discussion
Kline, Antczak, and Hazen & Williams demonstrated that collective identity is shaped
through argument; arguers create an identity from the aggregate of their arguments, and those
choices are challenged, shaped and overcoded by the rebuttals of other participants. The
controversy surrounding Ernie Fletcher’s decision to sign Thomas Clyde Bowling’s death
warrant is fundamentally a controversy about identity, about the persistence of a professional
role. Fletcher argued that his roles could exist in tandem, that he could detach one professional
role to carry out the tasks of another. Notably, while insisting that he would not give up his
medical license, Fletcher allowed his role as governor to override his role as physician, rather
than choosing the opposite set of priorities. One might assume the pursuit of medicine was a role
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more entangled with a person’s core values than the pursuit of political power, and thus more
difficult to put aside when the two came into conflict. For Fletcher, this was not the case.
If Gatter’s model accurately captures the dynamics of medical decisionmaking within a
shell of autonomy, then the divide between Drs. Groner and Zitrin on one side and Dr. Fletcher
on the other is a grave threat. Appropriateness is determined by consensus, and the very public
charge of unethical conduct, including a formal attempt to strip Fletcher of his license, reveals
cracks in that consensus. A recent AMA survey found that the majority of doctors are in favor of
physician participation in executions (Klug, 2002). And, perhaps even more surprising, many
physicians seem completely unaware that such participation even raises ethical questions (Liptak,
2004). The appropriateness of such participation, as a marker of the current state of medical
ethics, is quite unsettled and in need of further development through deliberation. 
If Applbaum is correct about role positivism, and the ease with which doctors can evade
outside scrutiny simply by redefining their roles and renouncing old practice as obsolete, then
Zitrin and Groner’s strategy carries an enormous risk of backfiring. They admit that they have
little hope of winning an across-the-board prohibition against physician participation in
executions, arguing instead that the pressure they bring to bear consists chiefly of publicity and
the accompanying embarrassment. And they have succeeded in changing the economics of
capital punishment; formerly, the state of Georgia paid physicians $850 to preside over an
execution. Now, a consultancy firm has been formed to offer physicians professional liability
insurance against exactly the kind of challenge Zitrin and Groner bring, and producing a doctor
to solemnize an execution costs Georgia taxpayers $18,000 (Campos, 2005, p. 1A). These
efforts, by raising the profile of the issue and making physicians aware that such acts are at a
minimum ethically troubling, may serve as the advocacy of role traditionalism that Applbaum
recommends, but they may also serve as the pressure that pushes doctors to throw off criticism
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and frame their own reconceptualized identity. It is notable that the language used by both sides
was hardly conducive to reasoned deliberation: various commentators called Zitrin and Groner’s
complaint “an example of just how dirty politics can be” (Focus on, 2004, ¶ 4) and “nothing
more than a cheap shot,” (Criticism of, 2004, ¶ 3), while Zitrin paralleled Fletcher’s ethical lapse
with those of the commanding officers at Abu Ghraib (2004), and both he and Groner invoked
Nazi atrocities (Groner, 2004).  Fletcher’s counsel, John Roach, called the complaint “an
irresponsible game of political football,” and his deputy general counsel, Michael Adams, labeled
it “a backdoor attempt to abolish capital punishment during the governor’s term of office,” and
concluded, “Though high on headlike-seeking sensationalism, this grievance has absolutely no
merit” (Biesk, 2005, ¶¶ 14-15), while Ray Larson, prosecutor in the Bowling case, dismissed the
complaint as a strategy of desperation: “I think everything they're doing is a ploy. The fact of the
matter is that every time there's a pending execution ... there's this mad scramble after all the
legal appeals are heard to come up with whatever kind of excuses possible.” (Yetter, 2004b, ¶
12). It is possible that the fireworks are just preliminaries, no more than signals that each side is
quite serious about its position, and that the more reasoned arguments described above will
persist and will inform both sides in future cases. But it is possible as well that the heated
language bodes ill for progress via deliberation toward mutual correction, as Ehninger somewhat
idealistically suggested should be the outcome of argument. 
Judges’ framework captures two very important characteristics of this controversy.
Fletcher has at no time defended his decision as squarely consistent with the ethics of medicine.
He has not made the somewhat convoluted argument that capital punishment is a form of therapy
and a way to respect the autonomy and individuality of the condemned, as others have attempted
to do (Mossman, 1992). His defense has been entirely defensive: the actions were taken under a
distinct role, so they did not constitute medical practice. Further, they were not his decision,
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undertaken with his initiative, but rather simple ratification of a decision made elsewhere. Both
are dissociation moves predicted in Judges’ work, and both suggest psychological stress
emanating from making, or at least defending, his decision. Furthermore, the gap between
Fletcher’s position and the position of the complainants demonstrates precisely the difference
Judges describes between thin and thick ethics: Fletcher argues only that he has not committed an
infraction and cannot be held accountable, while his opponents make a more nuanced argument
that he has assumed a different identity and should no longer bear the title of physician.
Conclusion
On November 8, 2004, Dr. Fletcher became the first physician to sign a death warrant in
possible violation of the American Medical Association’s code of ethics. On January 13, 2005,
the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure voted unanimously to dismiss Groner and Zitrin’s
charge that Fletcher had violated medical ethics and should forfeit his license. The controversy
opened up a fissure in the medical community’s smooth consensus regarding appropriate
practice. The arguments presented by each side followed patterns of deliberation on medical
matters, but left unanswered the question of whether the ongoing deliberation would be
productive, or the last exchange of communiqués before a rupture of dialogue and a defiant
reassertion of control by doctors over their own identity.
On January 21, 2005, Peter Pilz, a member of the Austrian parliament, introduced a bill to
strip Arnold Schwarzenegger of his Austrian citizenship. Earlier, Pilz’s Green Party colleagues
had circulated a petition to change the name of Arnold Schwarzenegger stadium in the city of
Graz, near Schwarzenegger’s birthplace. Schwarzenegger’s fall from grace was a radical turn of
events; just six months earlier, the Austrian government had released an Arnold Schwarzenegger
stamp, and Austrian papers had been filled with commentary that Schwarzenegger would make a
good president of the United States. The precipitating event that turned many Austrians against
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Schwarzenegger was his refusal of last minute clemency to Donald Beardslee, a convicted serial
killer. Within hours, Austrians were protesting outside the American embassy in Vienna. Pilz’s
explanation for the revocation of Schwarzenegger’s citizenship was, “Capital punishment is
unacceptable in Austria and in Europe, and no Austrian citizen may take part in it or arrange it”
(Kole, 2005, ¶ 17). And the toll of capital punishment-inspired role stress continued to mount.
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